



Order Amid Chaos: Security Devices
for Credit Transactions in Chinat
For over thirty years the economy of the People's Republic of China was
centrally directed under a rigid system of state planning. The state owned the vast
majority of Chinese enterprises and managed them by strict administrative fiat.
Through its central economic plan the government regulated all productive and
financial resources. Under this economic regime, China had little need for a
commercial financing system; instead, enterprises were financed directly by the
Government through budgetary allocation. After the Government set quotas
under the central economic plan, the treasury transferred capital allowances to
the state-owned enterprises through branches of the People's Bank of China.'
Central planners decided investment policy, granting, rather than loaning
investment funds. Allocation decisions often bore little relationship to the needs
of enterprises, thereby providing the enterprises with little incentive to be
efficient in their use of the apportioned funds. All profits made by the enterprises
were handed back to the state through the People's Bank. Thus, enterprises
functioned essentially as branches of the Government, with the People's Bank
acting as the state cashier.
This ossified productive structure, accompanied by a rigid system of con-
trolled prices and wages, presented a major obstacle to economic development.
The Government sought to remedy this situation by implementing radical
economic reforms. China's leaders hoped to promote the development of
commercially productive forces by reducing the role of central planning,
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1. Before 1978, the People's Bank of China, China's central bank, was the nation's only true
bank.
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adopting a market regulated economy, commercializing state-run enterprises,
and increasing allowances for private enterprise. 2 Fundamental to the reforms are
two important changes to the Chinese financing system: the development of
financial markets to facilitate equity financing and the development of commer-
cial banking to facilitate credit financing. Financial markets allow enterprises to
finance growth through the issue of stocks, bonds, and other securities, and their
development is vital to the long range success of the economic reforms. At
present, however, equity financing remains only at an experimental stage in
China. The new Chinese system of credit financing bears the main burden of the
nation's commercial finance and will continue to do so for some time.
The first step toward reform of enterprise financing in China was taken in
1979. In that year, the State Council began experimenting with reforms to the
financing of capital construction in certain designated regions.3 A system of bank
loans replaced budgetary appropriations for capital construction.4 A series of
administrative regulations gradually extended this system to other regions and for
other financing purposes. In 1984, the State Council approved a regulation
proposed by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. This regulation
abolished budgetary appropriation of operating capital by requiring all state-
owned industrial and commercial entities to fulfill their operating capital needs
exclusively through bank loans. In 1985, credit financing replaced budgetary
appropriation for investment in capital construction in all regions. 5
To allow these changes to the financing system, the Chinese Government
restructured and commercialized the banking system. 6 The People's Bank of
2. For an analysis of the current reforms see Chen, Are the Anti-Dumping Laws of Canada and
Other Western Countries Keeping Pace with China's Economic Structural Reform?, 19 LAW & POLY
INT'L Bus. 717, 744-52 (1987). For a summary of China's economic agenda, see Report on the Work
of the Government, Delivered at the First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress, Mar.
25, 1988, BEIJING REVIEW, No. 22, at 28-35 [hereinafter Report] (Apr. 25-May 1, 1988).
3. These were the cities of Shanghai and Beijing and the province of Guangdong. See
Guowuyuan Pizhuan Guojia Jiwei, Guojia Jianwei, Caizhengbu Guanyu Jiben Jianshe Touzi Shixing
Daikuan Banfa Baogao De Tongzhi (a Notice Approved by the State Council of the Report Submitted
by the State Planning Commission, the State Construction Commission and the Ministry of Finance
on the Experimental Forwarding of Loans for Investment in Capital Construction) (Aug. 28, 1979),
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANXING FAGUE HUEBIAN 1949-1985 (CAIMAOJUAN) (COMPILATION OF
CURRENT LAWS OF THE PRC 1949-1985 (FINANCE AND TRADE)), at 264.
4. Interim Regulations on Capital Construction Loans (approved by State Council, circulated
by State Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance and People's Construction Bank of China, Aug.
28, 1979). For the text, see ZHONGYAO JINGJI FAGUI XUANBIAN, [1977-861 (COMPILATION OF SELECTED
MATERIALS ON SOME IMPORTANT ECONOMIC LAWS AND REGULATIONS) 766-69 (Beijing: Chinese Stat. Press
1987) Ihereinafter COMPILATION OF SELECTED MATERIALS 1977-86].
5. See Interim Regulations of the State Planning Commission, Dec. 14, 1984, Ministry of
Finance and the People's Construction Bank of China (concerning Replacement of All Budgetary
Appropriation for Capital Construction with Bank Loans). For the text, see COMPILATION OF SELECTED
MATERIALS, 1977-86, supra note 4, at 607-12.
6. See Chen Muhua, A Review of the Reform of the Financing Structure of Our Country,
JINGRONG SHIBAO (FINANCIAL TIMES), 1 (Apr. 11, 1988). Pursuit of profit is not, however, the banks'
sole motivation. The banks must take the state economic plan into account when setting policy. See
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China's role is now restricted to functioning solely and exclusively as China's
central bank; commercial banking responsibilities have been given to a number
of specialized banks. These new banks include the Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the People's Bank of Construc-
tion, the Bank of China,7 and the Investment Bank of China.8
As a result of these modifications to the financing system, enterprises now
have the authority and the responsibility for raising their own funds in the form
of loans from these commercial banks or, in special cases, commercial credits
from other enterprises. The banks and other financial institutions have, in turn,
the authority to extend credit as well as the responsibility to require the payment
of interest and the repayment of the principal on loans. Consequently, both
enterprises and banks must assume financial responsibility for their credit
transactions. Enterprises are responsible for repaying all borrowed funds, while
the banks must demand repayment and ensure that loans are made to viable
enterprises for economically sound purposes. In this way the Government hopes
to ensure the efficient distribution and use of financial resources.
9
The success of this new system of credit financing in an environment of
financial responsibility required methods to secure these credit transactions. The
Chinese responded quickly to this demand. The development and present state of
credit security devices in the People's Republic of China is the central topic of
this article.
I. The Statutory and Regulatory Framework
Despite the importance of the new system of secured financing to the Chinese
economic reforms, only a few skeletal provisions in the national statutory law
deal with security devices for credit transactions. Provisions such as section 15
of the Economic Contract Law1° and article 89 of the General Principles of Civil
Chen Muhua, The Role of Financing in the Open Door Policy of Our Country, ZHONGGUo FAZHi BAO
(CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM NEWS), Aug. 19, 1987, at 1; Liu Hongru, Basic Ideas of the Reform of
Financing Structure of Our Country, 1987 HONGQI ZHAZHI (RED FLAG J.), No. 14, at 20, 25. (The RED
FLAG J. is the official journal of the Chinese Communist Party. Chen Muhua is State Commissioner
and the President of the People's Bank of China).
7. Note that this bank is distinct from the People's Bank of China.
8. For a detailed analysis of China's new banking system, see Chu, Banking and Finance in the
China Trade, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 343 (M.
Moser ed. 1987). It should be noted that two banks which are not directly owned by the state have
recently been established in China: the Bank of Communication and the China International Trust and
Investment Corporation (CITIC) Bank. Trust and investment corporations also play a part in the new
Chinese financing system, and are especially active in financing international business transactions;
see id. at 353.
9. Id. at 353.
10. Enacted by the National People's Congress of the PRC on Dec. 13, 1981. For the text in
Chinese, see ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALU HUIBIAN 1979-1984 (COMPILATION OF LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1979-1984) 239-58 (Beijing: People's Press, 1985). English translation
in CCH-AUSTRALIA LTD., CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS [hereinafter CCH] 5-500.
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Law (the Civil Law)" contain only broad guidelines, leaving national adminis-
trative law, regional' 2 regulations, the policy measures of lending institutions,
and the contract terms between the borrowing and lending parties to address the
regulatory details of a secured transaction.
National administrative regulation of secured transactions is provided in two
sets of regulations promulgated by the People's Bank of China.' 3 First, the
Provisional Rules of the People's Bank of China Concerning the Pledge of
Foreign Exchange by Foreign-Invested Enterprises for Renminbi Loans 14 sets out
the rules for a special transaction that allows foreign invested enterprises to
obtain Chinese currency by pledging foreign currency rather than exchanging it.
Second, the Provisional Measures of the People's Bank of China Governing the
Issue of Foreign Exchange Guarantees by Resident Institutions in China' 5
governs suretyships of foreign exchange loans in China. Each of these regula-
tions has a limited scope and neither is a comprehensive security law.
Promulgation of comprehensive secured transactions law has occurred in only
two areas of China, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (Shenzhen SEZ) and
the city of Shanghai. The Regulations of Shenzhen SEZ on Control of Secured
Loans (the Shenzhen Regulations) were the first detailed security laws in China. 16
The Shenzhen Regulations apply only to secured loan transactions between fi-
nancial institutions in the Shenzhen SEZ and individuals or foreign invested
enterprises. The Regulations notably do not cover loans to state-owned enterprises
within the Shenzhen SEZ. Though limited in application, the Regulations are
ground-breaking in China and provide a model security law for other regions.
Indeed, many provisions in the Shenzhen Regulations were copied in other
regional regulations, 17 and most notably, in two recently issued Shanghai regu-
lations: the Trial Provisions of the Shanghai Municipality for the Administration
11. Promulgated in Apr. 1986. For the text in Chinese, see COMPILATION OF SELECTED MATERIALS,
1977-86, supra note 4, at 40-53. English translation in CCH, supra note 10, 19-150.
12. The terms "regional" and "region" used in this paper correspond with the Chinese word
"Di Fang." "'Di Fang" refers to legal jurisdictions in China subordinate to the central government.
These jurisdictions include provinces, counties, municipalities, cities, and special economic zones.
"Di Fang" is also translated as "local" and "locality" in some publications.
13. As the People's Bank of China is China's central bank its regulations have the status of
administrative law. Unlike the quasi-law of the commercial bank regulations, the People's Bank
regulations apply to all economic actors and not just to the parties to individual loan contracts. See
infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
14. Promulgated on Dec. 12, 1986. For the text, see GULl WAISHANG TOuzi FAGUI HUIBIAN
(COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT) 12 (Depart-
ment of Treaties and Law of the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of the PRC, May,
1987) [hereinafter COLLECTION OF LAWS FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT]. English translation in CCH, supra
note 10, 8-694.
15. Promulgated by the People's Bank of China on Feb. 5, 1987. For the text, see id. at 13-14.
English translation in CCH, supra note 10, 8-698.
16. Promulgated by the Guangdong Provincial Regional People's Congress on Feb. 13, 1986.
English translation in CCH, supra note 10, 73-516.
17. See Fuzhou Provisional Regulations for the Control of Pawnbrokers (Trial) [hereinafter
Fuzhou Pawnbrokers Regulations] (on file with the authors).
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of Security for Renminbi Loans (the Shanghai Renminbi Regulations)' 8 and the
Trial Provisions of the Shanghai Municipality for the Administration of Security
for Foreign Exchange Loans (the Shanghai Foreign Exchange Regulations). 19 The
Shanghai Renminbi Regulations govern secured loan transactions involving the
financial institutions in Shanghai authorized to extend Renminbi loans and en-
terprises or other legal entities and individuals (as borrowers) in the Shanghai
Municipality. 20 The Shanghai Foreign Exchange Regulations control secured
foreign exchange loans borrowed by state-owned enterprises, collective enter-
prises, and foreign invested enterprises in the Shanghai region.
Policy measures issued by Chinese banks have appeared more quickly than
government regulations. For example, provisions regarding loan security have
recently been published by the Bank of China, 2 1 the Agricultural Bank of
China,22 the Shanghai Branch of the Agricultural Bank of China,23 the Bank of
Construction, 24 and the Shanghai Branch of the Industrial and Commercial
Bank.25 Since these banks have delegated administrative responsibilities and
commercial monopolies within their area of jurisdiction, their regulations can be
regarded as quasi-law. Furthermore, it should be remembered that these bank
regulations apply only to the banks' customers as a product of the loan contract
and do not apply to third parties.
II. Security Devices
Taken together, the skeletal nature of national statutory law, the patchwork
nature of national administrative law, the regional regulations, and the bank
18. Published by the People's Bank of China, Shanghai Branch, on June 9, 1988, after approval
by the Shanghai Municipal Government on June 7, 1988 [hereinafter Shanghai Renminbi Regula-
tions], CCH, supra note 10, 91-064.
19. These Regulations were approved by the Shanghai Municipal Government on June 7, 1988, and
were published June 9, 1988, by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control Bureau, Shanghai
Branch [hereinafter Shanghai Foreign Exchange Regulations], CCH, supra note 10, 91-061.
20. Shanghai Renminbi Regulations, supra note 18, § 3.
21. The Rules of the Bank of China on Loans to Foreign-Invested Enterprises, promulgated Apr.
24, 1987 [hereinafter Rules on Loans to Foreign-Invested Enterprises], CCH, supra note 10, 8-702.
These Rules will be of special interest to foreign investors.
22. The Trial Regulations of the Agricultural Bank of China on Secured or Guaranteed Loan
Contracts. For the text, see 1988 JINGRONG GUIZHANG ZHIDU WENXUAN (SELECTION OF FINANCIAL
REGULATIONS) No. 4, at 1-7.
23. The Trial Regulations of the Agricultural Bank of China (Shanghai Branch) on Secured Loan
Contracts, promulgated by Agricultural Bank of China (Shanghai Branch) on July 13, 1987. For the
text, see SELECTION OF FINANCIAL REGULATIONS, supra note 22, No. 9, at 50-53.
24. Interim Measures of the Bank of Construction on Security of Loan Contracts, circulated by
Bank of Construction on July 15, 1987. For the text, see 1987 JUIAN CAIwu FAGUI HUIBIAN
(COMPILATION OF ACCOUNTING REGULATIONS ON CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION) No. 17, at 481 (People's Bank
of Construction, Shanghai Branch).
25. Interim Trial Provisions of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Shanghai Branch)
on Security for Loans for Improvement of Technology, promulgated Dec. 1986. For the text, see
GONGSHANG YINGHANG SHANGHAI FENGHANG TONGZHI (CIRCULATING NOTICE OF INDUSTRIAL AND COMMER-
CIAL BANK OF CHINA, SHANGHAI BRANCH) No. 53.
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provisions give an impression of chaos in Chinese security law. China is many
years from developing a unified security law similar to either article 9 of the U.S.
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 26 or the Personal Property Security Acts
(PPSAs) of various Canadian jurisdictions. 27 Nevertheless, the Chinese have
quickly developed a sophisticated understanding of secured transactions and have
achieved a degree of conceptual unity in their disparate laws.
Current Chinese law provides for two main types of secured credit transac-
tions: the surety (baozheng) and the charge against collateral (di ya).28 The
following discussion analyzes both types of transactions. The emphasis, how-
ever, is on the charge against collateral, which has the greater role to play in
financing Chinese economic development.
A. SURETIES
After 1979, as credit financing developed in China, sureties initially com-
prised the standard security device for loan transactions. Lenders were reluctant
to advance capital to Chinese enterprises unless a financially secure third party
guaranteed repayment. Foreign investors especially demanded such guarantees.
Usually the Chinese Government, directly or indirectly, provided the security.
Since 1985, collateral security devices such as the mortgage and pledge have
rapidly developed in China, and the relative popularity of sureties has declined.
At present, however, the surety remains an important part of the Chinese credit
financing system and is regulated by a number of national laws and administra-
tive regulations.29
26. U.C.C. § 9, 3 U.L.A. 59 (1972) [hereinafter UCC].
27. Personal Property Security Act [Ont.], ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 375 (1980) [hereinafter ONT.
PPSA]; Personal Property Security Act [Man.], MAN. STAT. ch. 5 (1973); Personal Property Security
Act [Sask.], SASK. STAT. ch. P-6.1 (1979-80); and Personal Property Security Act [Yuk.], YUK. REV.
STAT. ch. 130 (1986).
28. See Civil Law, supra note 11, § 89. The Civil Law provides for two other types of secured
transactions: the possessory lien (liuzi) and the deposit (ding fin). The lien in China is not a common
secured transaction and is restricted largely to minor debts between service industries and their
clients. It has only an indirect connection to the Chinese financing system. Categorization of the
deposit as a form of secured credit transaction is questionable. The deposit is an unretumable advance
payment. It does not secure the performance of future payments or other obligations. The deposit has
no direct connection with credit transactions. The lien and the deposit will not be further discussed
in this paper.
29. Three national laws, the Economic Contract Law promulgated in 1979, supra note 10, the
Loan Contract Regulations promulgated in 1985, COMPILATION OF SELECTED MATERIALS 1977-86, supra
note 4, at 846, and the General Principles of Civil Law promulgated in 1986, supra note 11, contain
provisions governing sureties. In addition, a national administrative law, the 1987 Provisions of the
People's Bank of China Governing the Issue of Foreign Exchange Guarantees by Resident Institutions
in China, supra note 15, and two commercial bank provisions, the 1987 Rules of the Bank of China
on Loans to Foreign-Invested Enterprises, supra note 21, and the 1987 Interim Measures of the Bank
of Construction on Security for Loans, supra note 22, contain rules which further administer the use
of sureties as a security device.
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1. The Chinese Concept of Surety
The general concept of surety in China is the same as that in common law and
other jurisdictions: an agreement by which a third party secures a creditor for the
performance of an obligation owed by a debtor. Nevertheless, certain rules
governing the formation of the suretyship in China differ from those at common
law.30 More interesting, however, are the dissimilarities between Chinese and
common law concepts regarding the nature and the scope of a surety's obligation.
In China, the nature of the suretyship may be one of primary liability or
secondary liability. Chinese scholars term the former type a "joint liability"
suretyship (liandai zheren) and the latter a "compensative" suretyship (buchang
zheren).3 t A party providing a joint liability surety assumes jointly with the
principal debtor the primary recompensatory obligation. When the debt is due,
the creditor may ask either the principal debtor or the surety to fulfill the entire
outstanding obligation. 32 In contrast, a party providing a compensative surety to
the creditor assumes liability after the debt is due and only upon determination
that the principal debtor cannot repay the outstanding balance.3 3 Thus, under a
compensatory suretyship the creditor must always look first to the principal
debtor for repayment.
The scope of a suretyship, in contrast to its nature, refers to the monetary
extent of a surety's liability. China generally recognizes two degrees of liability:
liability for the outstanding debt only and liability for both the outstanding debt
and damages for breach of contract.
34
Chinese law parallels common law in dividing the surety into two types, the
indemnity and the guarantee. The indemnity refers to a surety's undertaking of
joint primary liability, while the guarantee refers to a surety's undertaking of
secondary liability only.35 Chinese and common law may thus appear identical
on this point, but a closer examination reveals that they differ in their treatment
of the relationship between the nature and scope of liability. Unless the contract
of suretyship provides otherwise, most common law jurisdictions directly link
the nature and the scope of the surety's liability: the primary liability suretyship,
30. For instance, Chinese law, unlike the common law, does not allow a suretyship to be
established by a contract between just the debtor and the surety. Both the creditor and the surety must
be parties to a contract establishing a suretyship. The debtor may be a party to the contract but his
direct participation, unlike that of the creditor and the surety, is not mandatory. For a summary of the
Chinese law, see Zhang Peiling, Security of Obligations, in ZHONGGUo DABAIKE QUANSHU, FAXUEJUAN
(CHINESE ENCYCLOPEDIA, LEGAL SCIENCE VOLUME) 724 (Beijing: Renmin Press, 1985) [hereinafter
CHINESE ENCYCLOPEDIA, LEGAL SCIENCE VOLUME]. For a summary of the common law, see 2 CHirrY ON
CONTRACTS paras. 4401-02 (A. G. Guest ed. 25th ed. 1983).
31. See TONG Rou, MINGFA YUANLI (PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW) 211 (Beijing: Falu Press, 1983).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Li Shengbing, Several Legal Issues on Suretyship and Sureties, CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM
NEWS, Aug. 21, 1987, at 3.
35. See 2 CHIrTY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 30, para. 4406.
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the indemnity, implies an obligation to repay both the debt and damages for
breach; the secondary liability suretyship, the guarantee, implies an obligation on
the part of the surety to repay only the outstanding debt. 36 In China, however, the
scope of a surety is entirely independent of its nature. The surety's liability may
be for the debt only or for the debt and the damages together, regardless of the
primary or secondary nature of the obligation.
The Chinese concepts of the nature and the scope of suretyship have emerged
in academic scholarship since the beginnings of economic reform. Since 1985,
however, the Chinese attempt to embody these concepts in formal legislation and
in bank regulations has caused considerable confusion. An example of this
confusion arises from the Economic Contract Law, the first Chinese legislation
containing provisions regulating suretyship, which provides in section 15: "If
the principal debtor fails to perform the contract, the surety shall be jointly liable
to compensate for any damages." 37 At first glance, this article appears to provide
only for the joint liability of sureties for damages arising out of breach.
Nevertheless, Professor Tong Rou, China's foremost civil law authority, has
interpreted it as providing for only secondary liability on the part of the surety,
despite the presence of the words "jointly liable." 38 Professor Tong's interpre-
tation of secondary liability is defensible because section 15 states that the
surety's obligation arises only "if the principal debtor fails to perform the
agreement." The vague wording of the provision supports both interpretations.
Under any reading, however, the provision is silent on the nature of the surety's
obligation for the initial debt.
Section 8 of the Loan Contract Regulations is equally problematic. 39 The Loan
Contract provision mirrors the language in the Economic Contract Law except
that the words "jointly liable to compensate for any damages" in the latter are
replaced by the words "jointly liable to pay the principal and the interest."
Again, whether the provision provides for primary or secondary liability is a
matter of debate. Converse to the Economic Contract Law, however, the Loan
Contract Regulations provision mentions the surety's obligation for the initial
debt but fails to address liability for damages.
The provisions on suretyship subsequently enacted in the Civil Law and in
various bank regulations seem to be an attempt to merge the concepts of the
Economic Contract Law and the Loan Contract Regulations. Article 89(1) of the
Civil Law provides: "If the principal debtor fails to perform the obligation, the
surety is liable to perform or assumes joint liability [with the principal debtor] in
36. See 14 CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST (ONTARIO) tit. 69, § 167 (Carswell Co. Ltd. 3d ed.
1984).
37. See supra note 10.
38. See TONG Rou, supra note 31, at 129.
39. See Loan Contract Regulations, supra note 29, art. 8 which provides: "If the borrower
defaults in the performance of the contract, the guarantor shall be jointly liable for the repayment of
the principal and interest."
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accordance with the terms of their contract.' 40 The surety provisions in various
bank regulations are, for the most part, based closely upon this portion of the
Civil Law.4 1 Like the surety provisions of the Economic Contract Law and the
Loan Contract Law, article 89(1) could be interpreted as authorizing either
primary or secondary liability suretyships. Article 89(1), however, specifies
"joint liability" as an alternative to "liable to perform," thereby indicating that
the Civil Law in fact addresses both primary and secondary liability. Unlike the.
provisions in the other laws, nothing in article 89(1) limits the scope of the
surety's liability to debt or damages only. Therefore, the terms of the suretyship
contract dictate liability under Civil Law.
Article 89(1) thus indicates that the intent of the Chinese legislation is much
clearer than can be gathered from a strict interpretation of the earlier laws. In our
view, Chinese inexperience in drafting economic legislation, not indecisiveness
or uncertainty in legislative intent, has produced the incoherence in their sureties
laws. A liberal cumulative construction of the laws may produce an enabling
rather than restrictive interpretation; the laws attempt formal authorization of the
use of the surety in China, while giving the parties to the suretyship contract
substantial freedom to determine the nature and scope of the surety's obligation.
This explanation is the only one consistent with the scholarly concept of
suretyship in China,42 in addition to having precedent in the common law
approach to suretyship agreements.4 3
Assuming that the Chinese surety laws are enabling rather than limiting, the
restrictive wording of the various laws may be interpreted as an attempt to
specify, in the absence of contractual stipulations, by the parties, the type of
suretyship that would apply. Admittedly, however, the absence of sufficiently
40. See supra note 11.
41. It should be noted, however, that one set of bank regulations, the 1987 Provisions of the
People's Bank of China Governing the Issue of Foreign Exchange Guarantees by Resident Institutions
in China, supra note 15, includes a section dissimilar in form to that in the Civil Law, supra note 11.
Section 2 of the People's Bank Regulations provides:
Foreign exchange guarantee herein mentioned refers to the undertaking by which the
guarantor possessing foreign exchange commits himself to the creditor that, when the
debtor fails to honor his contractual debt service, the guarantor shall fulfill his
obligation to repay.
This article, in addressing only the "obligation to repay," more closely resembles the
suretyship provision in the Loan Contract Regulations, supra note 29.
42. See Li Shengbing, supra note 34; see also TONG Rou, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO MINGFA
TONGZE JIANJIE (BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW) 207 (Beijing: China
University of Political Science and Law Press, 1987) [hereinafter GENERAL PRINCIPLES]; JIANG PING &
ZHANG PEILING, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO MINGFA TONGZE JIANGHUA (LECTURES ON THE GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW) 162-63 (Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 1986)
[hereinafter JIANG PING & ZHANG PEILING].
43. At common law, parties to a contract of suretyship have wide freedom to stipulate their rights
and obligations. In case of disagreement over the surety's obligation, a common law judge will use
all available evidence to determine which arrangement, which combination of choices with regard to
the nature and scope of liability, was actually intended by the parties. The new Chinese surety
legislation will allow China's judges to take much the same approach.
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clear language within the laws impedes the identification of a single type of
suretyship that would operate as a default specification. Revision of the sureties
laws should be undertaken to provide better guidance to those who interpret
them.
2. Eligibility
Further problems with Chinese suretyship law stem from its ill-advised eligi-
bility rules. On one hand, Chinese law creates unnecessary restrictions on freedom
of contract by requiring prospective sureties to meet standards of financial eli-
gibility. On the other hand, the law fails to address the eligibility of government
departments as sureties, a uniquely important factor to the use of sureties in China.
a. Financial Eligibility
A number of laws possessing varying degrees of specificity establish financial
eligibility standards for sureties in China. For instance, section 8 of the
Regulations on Loan Contracts provides a generally vague eligibility standard:
"A surety should have sufficient property to act as a surety . .."44 The 1987
Provisions of the People's Bank of China Governing the Issue of Foreign
Exchange Guarantees by Resident Institutions in China, however, have more
detailed requirements for sureties of external loan contracts. These provisions
permit only specially authorized financial institutions and "enterprise legal
persons" 45 with sources of foreign exchange income to act as sureties for loans
in foreign exchange from foreign creditors to Chinese enterprises. The provisions
also restrict the amount of foreign exchange debt a single institution can
guarantee.
For the most part, state-imposed financial standards for sureties are unneces-
sary in China. Under the free market philosophy now espoused in China, the
financial eligibility of a surety logically should be a matter of business practice,
not of law; bureaucratic restrictions will only hamper China's economic
development. If a creditor feels that a prospective surety has sufficient resources
to secure a debt adequately, there is little reason why external regulation should
forbid the suretyship on financial grounds. Fortunately, most of the present
financial eligibility standards are vague enough to avoid the creation of any real
restrictions.
Of the current financial restrictions, only the detailed and truly restrictive
eligibility rules of the 1987 People's Bank Provisions are defensible. Eager to
encourage foreign investment, the Chinese Government has been anxious to
assure the security of foreign loans to Chinese enterprises. To do so, the
Government has acted, outside of any contractual obligation, as a backup source
44. See supra note 29.
45. See Civil Law, supra note 11, "enterprise legal persons" are Chinese enterprises with the
status of legal person under the Civil Law.
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of foreign exchange. In situations where the debtor and the primary surety have
insufficient foreign exchange to repay these loans, the Government provides
foreign exchange from its own reserves to prevent default. As the state has
accepted ultimate responsibility for such loans, it is necessary that it create
restrictions upon eligibility for the primary suretyship arrangement. To do
otherwise would risk China's extremely limited foreign exchange reserves.
b. Eligibility of Government Departments
While the Chinese have enacted financial eligibility rules for banks and
independent enterprises, they have neglected to address the eligibility of
government departments as contractually bound sureties. This issue is not merely
academic in China, primarily because very few independent organizations in
China possess adequate financial resources to act as sureties. Furthermore, the
few organizations with sufficient resources to act as sureties, such as banks and
larger enterprises, are reluctant to do so because of the high risk of default on the
part of a principal debtor. These inherent risks arise from the inexperience of the
new Chinese enterprise managers and the general volatility of the Chinese
economy under the new reforms. Therefore, unless the Government can act as a
surety, many potentially beneficial economic arrangements, including those
envisioned by the state economic plan, could be jeopardized by the lack of
adequate security.
Despite the lack of authorizing legislation, government departments have
frequently acted as sureties in China. Since the beginning of the economic
reforms, Chinese law has, with one exception,46 been silent on this important
issue. Recent Chinese legal scholars have unequivocally opposed government
eligibility as a surety.47 These scholarly objections emerge from the philosoph-
ical foundation of the economic reforms: the separation of enterprise manage-
ment from direct government control.4 8 In order to encourage economic
efficiency, the Chinese assert that all enterprises should be considered indepen-
46. Only the 1987 Provisions of the People's Bank of China Governing the Issue of Foreign
Exchange Guarantees by Resident Institutions in China mention government eligibility. These
Provisions implicitly prohibit government departments from acting as contractually bound primary
sureties to secure loans from foreign lenders. See Provisional Measures, supra note 15, art. 4:
The issue of foreign exchange guarantee is restricted to the following institutions:
(1) financial institutions with legal authority to deal in foreign exchange guaran-
tees;
(2) non-financial enterprise-legal-persons (incorporated enterprises) with sources
of foreign exchange income.
Government departments fall under neither of these categories and thus would require special
authorization to act as sureties for foreign exchange loans. It should be noted that the restrictions do
not apply to government-owned commercial banks, such as the Bank of China. These banks are
financially independent institutions falling within the first of the above categories.
47. See, e.g., Ma Jie, The Eligibility of the Surety Must Be in Compliance with the Legal
Requirements, JINGJI CHANKAO (ECONOMic REFERENCE) Mar. 26, 1988, at 4.
48. See Chen, supra note 2, and Report, supra note 2.
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dent managerial entities, responsible for their own profits and losses. Allowing
the Government to enter into suretyship agreements would conflict with this new
philosophy because the state as a surety would incur ultimate financial respon-
sibility for the debts of poorly managed enterprises. The Constitution provides
additional support for this scholarly view; section 89 of the 1982 Constitution,
enumerating the administrative powers of the state, does not authorize govern-
ment departments to participate directly in commercial activities.
The status of government suretyships is further put in doubt by the apparent
unwillingness of the central treasury to back up suretyship debts incurred by
government departments. Ma Jie, in a 1988 article in Jingji Chankao (Economic
Reference),49 cites an example of the central treasury's antipathy. A government
body signed a suretyship contract for the benefit of a debtor that was under its
administrative control. This government body, however, lacked the financial
resources to perform its suretyship obligation upon the debtor's default. The
treasury subsequently refused to allocate extra funds to the government depart-
ment and the debt remained unpaid. Since final resolution of the case has not yet
occurred, it is possible that the Government may eventually decide to honor the
debt of its department. Nevertheless, given the present state of Chinese law on
sureties, it is doubtful that government payment could be enforced.
Despite the philosophical and constitutional barriers, the practice of govern-
ment sureties for domestic loans continues in China. Increased awareness of the
scholarly objections coupled with the possible legal unenforceability of the
government suretyships have led to a decline in popularity of the practice. As
government suretyships become less common, the usefulness of the surety as a
security device in China will decline further. Creditors and borrowers increas-
ingly will turn to the more flexible security device, the charge against collateral.
B. CHARGES AGAINST COLLATERAL
Before 1986, charges against collateral were extremely rare in China. Prior to
February of that year Chinese law made no mention of the use of the charge as
a security device. Charges were not specifically forbidden, but the absence of
specific legislative permission for their use caused creditors and debtors to
hesitate before incorporating the charge within the terms of loan contracts. In
February 1986, the Government promulgated the Shenzhen Regulations, thereby
authorizing and regulating in detail the use of the charge to secure loans to
foreign invested enterprises within the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.
Adopted in April 1986, article 89(2) of the Civil Law authorized the use of the
charge throughout China, though it did not include comprehensive regulations.
Subsequently, a number of national administrative laws, regional regulations,
and bank policy statements have been issued to supply supplementary regulatory
detail.
49. Ma Jie, supra note 47.
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The advent of the charge against collateral has added considerable flexibility
to Chinese credit transactions. Borrowers can now obtain credit on the strength
of their own assets. They no longer need the cooperation of third parties to act
as sureties. Additionally, the credit system has been strengthened in that the
charge against collateral places most of the risk of the credit transaction upon its
prime beneficiary, the debtor, while at the same time providing the debtor with
more power to determine the extent of risk it will bear. Government consent to
the charge against collateral has considerably increased the credit available in
China.
1. Collateral
The use of collateral to secure credit is permitted in China by the simple terms
of section 89(2) of the Civil Law: "The obligor or a third party may provide
specific property as collateral to secure performance of obligations ... " 50
Regulation of collateral does not end, however, with this simple provision.
China, unlike common law jurisdictions, finds it necessary to specify, in various
local and national security regulations, which types of property may and may not
be used as collateral. The Trial Provisions of the Shanghai Municipality for the
Administration of Security for Renminbi Loans furnish a typical example of
collateral specifications among regional laws. Section 6 of the Provisions
provides:
The security interest may be charged upon the following types of property:
(1) Houses and other buildings;
(2) Land use rights;
(3) Productive materials such as machinery, equipment, transport, fin-
ished products and raw materials;
(4) Securities such as stocks, bonds and debentures, negotiable instru-
ments, bills of lading, and warehouse and storage receipts; and
(5) Other transferable properties.5 '
Similar collateral specification is found in the various bank provisions. 52
a. Categories: Immovables, Movables, and Rights
Chinese scholars divide the collateral specified in Chinese secured transaction
law into three categories: immovables, movables, and rights.
53
i. Immovables. Immovables are defined as tangible property (youxing
caichan) that will substantially depreciate in value if moved from their original
50. The term "property" used here is a translation of the Chinese term "caichan"; see infra
notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
51. Shanghai Renminbi Regulations, supra note 18.
52. See, e.g., Interim Measures of the People's Bank of Construction on Security of Loan
Contracts, supra note 24, § 6.
53. See, e.g., JIANG PING & ZHANG PEILING, MINGFA JIAOCHENG (CIVIL LAW TEXTBOOK) 170-71
(Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 1986).
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location.54 Thus, the concept of immovables in China includes both land and
buildings. Not all immovables, however, function as collateral under current
Chinese law. The use of land as collateral operates as the most important
restriction since China strictly prohibits the private ownership of land. Land use
rights,55 however, may be privately held, though this is itself a recent
phenomenon; 56 Chinese legal writing classifies these land use rights as abstract
rights rather than immovables, With the prohibition against transactions in land
itself, buildings are the most common form of immovable collateral in China.
Although the Civil Law does not specifically allow buildings as collateral, all
regional security regulations give such permission. In addition, certain special
regional regulations as well as various bank regulations specifically allow houses
to be used as collateral. 57
ii. Movables. Movables are defined as tangible property other than
immovables. 58 The various Chinese regional security laws and bank regulations
specifically categorize movables into three types: equipment, inventory, and
consumer goods.
Equipment is operative productive capital. The Shanghai Renminbi Regula-
tions and Shanghai Foreign Exchange Regulations both permit the use of
"machinery, equipment and transport" as collateral. The Shenzhen Regulations
provide only that goods may function as collateral, but the term "goods" in the
Shenzhen Regulations has a broad meaning that covers all types of equipment.
Inventory under Chinese definitions has much the same meaning as inventory
under the definitions of the U.S. UCC and the Canadian PPSAs and includes raw
materials that are used or consumed by a productive enterprise as well as finished
54. Id. at 67-68; see also CHINESE ENCYCLOPEDIA, LEGAL SCIENCE VOLUME, supra note 30, at 628.
55. Land use rights in China allow the holder to enjoy the use of land for a certain period.
According to existing regional legislation the term may not exceed fifty years. The holder of the
rights must pay an annual fee for using the land in addition to the purchase price for the rights. In
these respects, the Chinese concept of "land use rights" is unlike the common law fee simple and
life estate; it most closely resembles a long-term lease. See Shanghai Municipality Measures on
Transfer of Land Use Rights for Value, promulgated by Shanghai Municipality People's Government
on Nov. 29, 1987, CCH, supra note 10, 91-034; Hainan Measures for Land Administration,
promulgated by Hainan Province Preparatory Authority on Feb. 13, 1988, CCH, supra note 10,
96-200; Haikou City Regulations on Transfer of Land Use Rights for Value, promulgated by Haikou
City People's Government on Feb. 14, 1988, 2 CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, Mar. 28, 1988, No. 3, at 23;
see also Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Land Administration Interim Regulations, promulgated
by the Standing Committee of Guangdong Provincial People's Congress on Jan. 8, 1988, CCH,
supra note 10, 73-500.
56. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
57. The Shanghai Regulations on the Transfer of Land Use Rights, supra note 55, ch. 4, and the
Shenzhen Regulations on the Transaction of Houses as Commodities, 2 COLLECTION OF RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN GUANGDONG PROVINCE OF THE PRC 30, § 6 (Shenzhen
Municipal Law & Regulations Division ed. 1984), are two examples.
58. See JIANG PING & ZHANG PEILING, supra note 42, at 68; see also CHINESE ENCYCLOPEDIA, LEGAL
SCIENCE VOLUME, supra note 30, at 628. "Movables" in Chinese law, unlike "chattels" in common
law, does not include intangibles such as abstract rights.
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products held by productive or retail enterprises. Both Shanghai Regulations
allow finished products and raw materials to be used as collateral.
Allowing the use of raw materials as collateral is important since it opens up
the possibility that China will accept the "floating charge. ' 59 A charge against
raw materials is similar to a floating charge as the charger is presumably allowed
to retain possession of the materials and consume them in the manufacturing
process. Under Chinese law a charger must usually maintain the integrity of
collateral; 60 allowing raw materials to be an exception to this rule may be the first
step towards a general floating charge.
Consumer goods were an insignificant form of collateral before Chinese law
permitted private enterprise. 61 Recently, however, with the Government increas-
ingly encouraging private enterprise and consumption, charges against consumer
goods have become common; private individuals obtain loans for their business
operations and their consumer purchases by offering such goods as collateral.
Both the Shanghai Renminbi Regulations and the Shenzhen Regulations allow
private individuals to provide consumer goods as collateral.
iii. Rights. Chinese legal scholarship classifies abstract property rights
separately from movables and immovables. Many different types of rights are
specifically allowed as collateral, including securities, instruments, and contrac-
tual rights, with land use rights being the most important.
As explained earlier, commercial transactions with land use rights were strictly
prohibited until just recently.62 Relaxation of this prohibition began with a
general policy statement from the Communist Party of China's October 1987
13th National Congress sanctioning in principle transactions involving land use
rights.6 3 Soon after, the Shanghai Municipality promulgated the Regulations on
the Transfer of Land Use Rights for Value, 64 as an experiment. These regulations
allowed transactions in land use rights and the use of these rights as collateral.
On December 29, 1987, the Shenzhen SEZ also promulgated a law allowing for
the transfer and mortgaging of land use rights.65 The province of Hainan passed
similar provisions in February 1988.66 The initial Communist Party policy
statement and the local governments' experimental regulations were confirmed
on April 12, 1988, when the National People's Congress passed an amendment
59. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Shanghai Renminbi Regulations, supra note 18, § 20, which states: "Parties to a
secured loan contract must take reasonable steps for the safekeeping of, and must maintain the
integrity of collateral which is in their possession. If the collateral is in the possession of the chargee,
the charger may, if the contract so provides, inspect the collateral."
61. JIANG PING & ZHANG PEILING, supra note 53, at 171.
62. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
63. See Du Runsheng & Gao Shangquan, Economic Reform, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)
Oct. 26, 1987, at 1.
64. Shanghai Municipality Measures on Transfer of Land Use Rights for Value, supra note 55.
65. Shenzhen S.E.Z. Land Administration Interim Regulations, supra note 55.
66. Hainan Measures for Land Administration, supra note 55.
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to the Constitution. One sentence was added to article 10: "Land use rights may
be transferred in compliance with relevant laws." This amendment comprises a
very significant step in the evolution of Chinese economic reforms and is taken
into account by all of the subsequent regional security laws. 6 7
Another important development in Chinese commercial law deals with the use
of securities and instruments as collateral. Both of the Shanghai Provisions
consent to the use of stocks, bonds, instruments, bills of lading, and warehouse
receipts as collateral. The Shenzhen Regulations and the Regulations of the Bank
of China on Providing Loans to Enterprises with Foreign Investment also permit
securities and payment certificates as collateral; however, they do not define the
nature of the allowable securities and certificates. It should be noted, as well,
that Chinese state bonds are now among the acceptable types of collateral.6 8
Contractual rights are also allowed as collateral in China. The Shenzhen
Regulations, for example, permit a cooperative joint venture's contractually
stipulated right for future profits to be used as collateral. 69 Also, the Regulations
of the Bank of China on Loans to Foreign-Invested Enterprises provide that
"equity shares and other transferable rights and interests" may act as loan
security.70 Other laws and regulations do not expressly specify that contractual
rights may be used as collateral, but the catchall provision in most of these laws
and regulations, which allows the utilization of all "other transferable proper-
ties" as collateral, seems to permit the use of contractual rights. 7' These catchall
provisions, common to most Chinese security laws and bank regulations, are
highly significant. They acknowledge all types of transferable properties not
specified by other provisions as collateral. Thus, the catchall provisions
essentially define acceptable collateral in Chinese law as any transferable
property.
67. See Shanghai Foreign Exchange Regulations, supra note 19, § 6(4); Shanghai Renminbi
Regulations, supra note 18, § 6(2). Both allow land use rights to be used as collateral. Shenzhen
Regulations, supra note 16, promulgated before the amendment of the Constitution, did not directly
address this issue. Nevertheless, land use rights may be used as collateral in the Shenzhen S.E.Z. by
virtue of the Shenzhen S.E.Z. Land Administration Interim Regulations, supra note 55, as well as
the constitutional amendment.
68. In the first four PRC State Bonds Regulations of 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984, the use of state
bonds as collateral was forbidden. The subsequent regulations of 1985 and 1986 reversed this
prohibition and specifically permitted charges against state bonds. For the texts of these regulations,
see COMPILATION OF SELECTED MATERIALS, 1977-86, supra note 4, at 645 (§ 9), 647 (§ 9), 649 (§ 9),
650 (§ 9), 651 (§ 9), and 652 (§ 10).
69. Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 16, § 5(4).
70. See the Provisional Rules of the People's Bank of China Concerning the Pledge of Foreign
Exchange by Foreign-Invested Enterprises for Renminbi Loans, supra note 14, § 16(2).
71. The Shanghai Renminbi Regulations, supra note 18, § 6; the Shanghai Foreign Exchange
Regulations, supra note 19, § 6; the Trial Regulations of the Agricultural Bank of China on Secured
or Guaranteed Loan Contracts, supra note 22, § 7; see also the Interim Measures of the People's
Bank of Construction on Security of Loan Contracts, supra note 24, § 6, and the Rules of the Bank
of China on Loans to Foreign-Invested Enterprises, supra note 21, § 16(2). The Shenzhen
Regulations, supra note 16, § 5, meanwhile allow "other interests" to be used as collateral without
referring specifically to transferability.
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b. Purposes of Specification
The specification of eligible types of collateral serves two purposes in Chinese
law: it answers the much debated question regarding the qualification of abstract
financial rights, in addition to tangibles, as collateral in China, and it serves as
a general guide for investors and entrepreneurs on the appropriate use of
collateral to secure credit transactions.
For a number of years Chinese legal writers have debated whether or not
abstract economic rights can be considered property. This debate arises from the
lack of a consistent definition of the term "property" (caichan) in Chinese law.
Some writers argue that property includes only tangibles (youxing caichan),
while others hold that property includes rights as well as tangibles. The former
group of writers define property as: "a [tangible] thing per se, or a summation
of things. When we speak of the delivery of property, it means the delivery of
things."7 a Meanwhile, the latter group argue: "Property may sometimes include
property rights other than the ownership, such as inheritances, rights under
contracted management agreements, intellectual property and legal causes of
action.'' 73 This academic debate has been settled-at least with regard to the
practical matter of determining the eligibility of rights as collateral-by the
specification section of Chinese security laws. All of these laws allow charges
against rights. Whatever the academic opinion about the definition of the term
"property" in China, rights are, without doubt, an acceptable form of collateral.
The specification of collateral also represents a general guide for inexperi-
enced Chinese entrepreneurs and foreign investors. Since secured transactions
are a recent development in Chinese law and business practice, many Chinese
and foreign businessmen are often unfamiliar with the new system; neither group
may know of the broad range of property now allowed as collateral in China. In
the past, frequent changes to administrative regulations governing allowable
types of collateral contributed to Chinese and foreign investor uncertainty.
Consistent and stable specification of acceptable collateral in the new secured
transactions laws may help to reduce this uncertainty and engender business
confidence.
Specification of collateral thus serves current Chinese needs. Nevertheless,
such particularization is unusual by the standards of other contemporary security
laws; neither the U.S. UCC nor the Canadian PPSAs itemize acceptable
collateral. The UCC and PPSAs classify collateral without listing acceptable
collateral; rather, the classification serves special purposes such as determining
priority rules, enhancing consumer protection, and facilitating special registra-
tion schemes.74 As Chinese and foreign business communities become familiar
with secured transactions in China, specification likely will be deleted from
72. Cited by JIANG PING & ZHANG PEILING, supra note 53, at 63.
73. Id.
74. See UCC supra note 26, § 9-313, and ONT. PPSA supra note 27, §§ 34, 58.
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Chinese security laws, and a classification system similar to that of the UCC will
be adopted in its stead.
c. Restrictions on Acceptable Types of Collateral
The corollary to the specification of acceptable types of collateral in Chinese
law is the specification of unacceptable collateral properties. All of the current
Chinese security laws and most of the bank regulations insert a restrictive term
in their collateral provisions. While the restricted properties vary from one law
to the other, three general types exist: nontransferable properties; properties
subject to certain legal disputes, including those involving ownership, improper
registration, or attachment or seizure of properties; and stocks and bonds issued
by the charger.
The use of nontransferable properties as collateral is the primary restriction
and appears in all of the Chinese security laws. This restriction naturally results
from transferability being the primary requirement for acceptable collateral. The
restriction is thus inevitable if transferability is to be maintained as a criterion of
acceptable collateral. Even so, the restriction causes problems because it fails to
distinguish adequately between absolutely and partially nontransferable prop-
erty.
Absolutely nontransferable properties include natural resources, such as land,
minerals, water supplies, consumer goods coupons,75 as well as goods deemed
socially unacceptable, such as illegal drugs, and pornographic and antirevolu-
tionary publications. Criminal and administrative laws absolutely prohibit the
transfer of these goods. The prohibition against the use of these goods as
collateral therefore is logical, although redundant.
Conversely, partially nontransferable properties are properties that may be
privately owned, but may not be traded on the public market. Transfer of these
properties may occur only in accordance with the regulations mandating sales to
government agents and allowing for private sales only upon the fulfillment of
certain administrative requirements. Properties of this type include gold, silver,
properties of cultural or historical value, and imported goods given special
customs exemptions. Since these properties may be privately owned, and under
certain conditions, transferred for value, they have potential value as collateral.
Unfortunately, Chinese law fails to distinguish them from absolutely nontrans-
ferable properties, thereby leaving open the question of their eligibility as
collateral.7 6 In principle, there is no reason why partially transferable properties
75. In China, certain types of food and durable goods are sold only upon the presentation of
state-issued coupons by the purchaser.
76. For instance, § 7 of the Administration Rules on Gold and Silver, promulgated by the State
Council of the PRC on June 15, 1983, CCH, supra note 10, 8-680, absolutely prohibits the use of
these precious metals as collateral, notwithstanding the fact that they may be sold for value to the
People's Bank of China. No particular laws, however, prohibit properties of historical or cultural
value, or goods given special customs exemption from being used as collateral. The legislation
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should not be allowed as collateral if both the borrower and creditor agree to
abide by the administrative requirements for transfer.
Most regulations also prohibit the use as collateral of properties subject to
certain legal disputes. Examples of these legal property conflicts include disputes
of property ownership, nonregistered properties subject to registration, and
properties seized or attached as the result of legal proceedings. These types of
restrictions appear in various forms and combinations in both Shanghai
Regulations,7 7 in the Interim Measures of the People's Construction Bank of
China on Security of Loan Contracts, 78 the Shenzhen Regulations, 79 and in the
Trial Regulations of Agricultural Bank of China on Secured and Guaranteed
Loan Contracts.
80
While a problem obviously arises with the creation of a security interest in
property subject to these legal disputes, the new Chinese security laws impre-
cisely identify such properties as prohibited types of collateral. Problems with
the use of these properties as collateral stem from the debtor's lack of clear title
(or lesser legal claim), with clear title being required to create a security interest.
These properties are not per se prohibited from being used as collateral, but
rather cannot be used until the necessary legal prerequisites to creation of the
security interest have been fulfilled. Consequently, the problems do not relate to
the specification of allowable types of collateral, but only to the legal require-
ments for the creation of a security interest.
Only the Shanghai Renminbi Regulations restrict stocks and bonds issued by
the charger from being used as collateral. 8 1 The purpose of this restriction is to
prevent situations in which the creditor's interest has apparently been secured,
but in reality has been given no priority. For example, if a bank accepts stocks
or bonds issued by the debtor as collateral to secure a loan and the debtor
subsequently goes bankrupt, the bank will not have the status of a secured
creditor; instead, the bank will be only a general creditor, on the same priority
governing these types of property do not address the issue. The Protection of Historical and Cultural
Relics Law of the PRC, the Provisions of the State Council Encouraging Foreign Investment (Oct.
11, 1986), CCH, supra note 10, 13-509. The Rules on Supervision of Import and Export Goods
and Exemption of Customs for Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Enterprises (Apr. 30, 1984), CCH
50-625. The Rules on Supervision of Import and Export Goods and Exemption of Customs
Concerning with Sino-Foreign Cooperative Enterprises, CCH, supra note 10, 50-600. Alone
among the regional regulations, § 8 of the Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 16, provides for charges
upon goods with special customs exemptions provided that the parties to the transaction first obtain
the consent of Chinese customs.
77. Shanghai Renminbi Regulations, supra note 18, § 7; Shanghai Foreign Exchange Regula-
tions, supra note 19, § 7.
78. The Interim Measures of the People's Construction Bank of China on Security of Loan
Contracts, supra note 22, § 7.
79. Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 16, § 6.
80. The Trial Regulations of the Agricultural Bank of China on Secured or Guaranteed Loan
Contracts, supra note 22, § 8.
81. Shanghai Renminbi Regulations, supra note 18, § 7(6).
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level as other holders of the debtor's stocks or bonds. The restriction against such
a transaction thus purports to protect the interest of creditors. This type of
restriction is inconsistent with other Chinese commercial laws and, in our
opinion, is inappropriate. As long as creditors are fully aware of the nature of
their transactions, they should always possess the option to enter into transac-
tions outside the realm of secured transactions. Chinese law has no general
prohibition against unsecured transactions. Therefore, a specific prohibition in
this situation has no basis.
2. Collateral Security Devices
In China, as in common law jurisdictions, there are a number of different
collateral security devices. National and regional legislation contain detailed
regulation of some of these security devices, while other security devices exist
only as unregulated business practices. Chinese secured transaction law, how-
ever, does not separately classify these security devices. Section 89(2) of the
Civil Law, as well as national and regional secured transaction regulations, 82 for
instance, simply authorize the use of the "charge against collateral" (di ya), a
comprehensive concept encompassing any type of collateral security device. To
facilitate corporative analysis, we have structured our discussion of collateral
security devices after the North American classifications of security devices.
Thus, pledge, assignment, mortgage, chattel mortgage, conditional sale, lease,
floating charge, and consignment are discussed in turn. Although they may not
be recognized as distinct forms, all of these devices, with the exception of the
floating charge, are employed in China. Nevertheless, the extent of, and the
approach to, their use in China often differs significantly from that in the United
States and Canada.
a. Pledge
The Chinese and the common law concepts of pledge are very similar. The
creditor (pledgee) in a common law pledge takes possession of the collateral to
secure the obligation owed by the pledgor.83 The common law pledge differs
from the mortgage in that the pledgee acquires possession of the collateral rather
than title. Similarly, the Chinese Encyclopedia Legal Volume 84 (a work similar
in nature to the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law) defines pledge
as: "a right with which the creditor takes possession of the collateral provided by
the debtor or a third party as security, and with which his claim may have priority
82. E.g., the Provisional Rules of the People's Bank of China Concerning the Pledge of Foreign
Exchange by Foreign-Invested Enterprises for Renminbi Loans, supra note 14, § I and the Shenzhen
Regulations, supra note 16, § 1.
83. See E. TYLER & N. PALMER, CROSSLEY VAINES' PERSONAL PROPERTY 459 (5th ed. 1973) (citing
Blundell-Leigh v. Attenborough, 3 K.B. 235 (C.A. 1921)).
84. Supra note 30.
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to be satisfied by the proceeds from the sale of collateral." 85 Thus, in China, as
at common law, the core of this security device is transfer of possession.
Additionally, in both Chinese and common law possession includes constructive
possession; the pledgee need not take actual, physical possession of some types
of collateral. Both Shanghai Regulations, Fuzhou Pawnbrokers Regulations, and
various bank provisions specifically allow the pledge of bills of lading,
warehouse receipts, storage receipts, or documents of title.86
Although indistinguishable in name from other collateral security devices,
87
the pledge is distinctly required by Chinese law in a number of situations. The
most interesting and important of these is the pledge of foreign exchange made
by foreign invested enterprises for the purpose of securing Renminbi loans from
the Bank of China, or other authorized banks. This type of transaction helps
foreign-invested enterprises obtain Renminbi without converting their foreign
exchange into the Chinese currency. In accordance with the 1986 Provisional
Rules of the People's Bank of China Concerning the Pledge of Foreign Exchange
by Foreign-Invested Enterprises for Renminbi Loans, foreign invested enterprises
may provide foreign currency as collateral for loans of Renminbi. The foreign
currency is pledged with the lender bank until the borrower enterprise pays off
the Renminbi loan with profits earned in China. If the borrower defaults, the
lender bank may dispose of the collateral. This form of pledge is intended to
encourage foreign investment by allowing foreign invested enterprises to avoid
the burdensome procedures encountered when applying to the Chinese Govern-
ment for foreign currency allowances.
b. Assignment of Rights
Chinese secured transaction law effectively authorizes the assignment of
intangibles as a security device, thereby establishing rights as collateral. The
assignment of these rights as collateral is particularly useful for China in two
situations: when businesses with extensive outstanding accounts require loans,
but have few tangible assets to offer as collateral, and when chains of delayed
repayment exist. A typical example of the first situation occurs with loans to
enterprises of the service industry. Service industry businesses often have few
securable tangible assets and thus are forced to use accounts receivable as
85. Id. at 55.
86. Shanghai Foreign Exchange Regulations, supra note 19, § 6(3); Shanghai Renminbi
Regulations, supra note 18, § 6(3); Regulations of Agricultural Bank of China, supra note 23,
§ 7(1); Bank of Construction Regulations, supra note 24, § 6(1); The Industrial and Commercial
Bank, Shanghai Branch Regulations, supra note 25, § 3(1); and Fuzhou Pawnbrokers Regulations,
supra note 17, § 11.
87. JIANG PING & ZHANG PELING, supra note 53, at 170: "[i]n Chinese law, there is no distinction
between the pledge and charge. They are generally called Di Ya (charge)." The Shanghai Foreign
Exchange Regulations, supra note 19, § 12(5); Shanghai Renminbi Regulations, supra note 18,
§ 21(3), and Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 16, § 11(7) all allow parties to the secured
transaction contract to agree upon the conditions of possession of collateral.
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collateral for their loans. The Shenzhen Regulations give express permission to
this form of transaction.
88
A chain of delayed repayment, the second major problem addressed by the
Chinese assignment of rights, arises when a debtor enterprise cannot pay its
outstanding bills because other parties to whom the debtor has extended credit
are late in repayment. The situation often arises in China's unstable economy,
and can result in multiple bankruptcies, or, more likely, in temporary shutdowns
due to lack of working capital. Allowing the transfer of rights as collateral
enables debtors to obtain temporary loans by assigning their accounts receivable
as collateral and thus avoid the immediate threat of a shutdown or bankruptcy.
This device adds considerable flexibility to Chinese credit transactions.
c. Mortgage in Realty
Although the common law mortgage in realty has no exact counterpart in
Chinese law, it is analogous to the Chinese charge against immovable property.
As with the common law mortgage in realty, the Chinese charge against
immovable property creates a security interest in property that remains in the
charger's possession. Also like the common law mortgage, but unlike most other
Chinese security devices, the charge against immovable property requires
registration at a government registry office.
89
A significant difference between the common law mortgage and the Chinese
charge against collateral should be noted. By definition, the common law mort-
gage demands transfer of title to the mortgagee; conversely, the Chinese charge
against immovable property does not require the charger to transfer title of the
immovables to the chargee. Most Chinese legal scholars argue that the lack of a
legal requirement would allow the charger to retain possession of title should the
parties so agree. 9° Thus, under Chinese law, the charge against immovable
property encompasses the civil law concept of hypotheca in which neither possession
nor title is transferred to the chargee. In practice, however, most Chinese creditors
require transfer of title when a loan is secured by a charge against immovables. 9 1
The charge against immovable property is rarely used in China. Unlike the
common law charge against realty, the Chinese charge against immovables does
not allow charges upon land itself. 92 Only houses or other buildings may be
88. Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 16, § 5(4).
89. For example, the SEZ Land Administration Interim Regulations, § 39; the Haikou City
Regulations on the Transfer of Land Use Rights for Value, § 22 and the Shanghai Municipality
Measures on Transfer of Land Use Rights for Value, § 35. See supra note 55.
90. See GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 42, at 209 and JIANG PING & ZHANG PEILING, supra note
42, at 165.
91. See Shenyang Undertaking Experiment on Security by Capital, Renmin Ribao (People's
Daily), Sept. 13, 1986, at 3.
92. Only land use fights may be charged. Such a charge is classified under assignment or transfer
of rights rather than mortgages in realty or charges against immovable property. See supra notes
55-57 and 72-77 and accompanying text.
VOL. 24, NO. I
SECURITY DEVICES FOR CREDIT TRANSACTIONS IN CHINA 107
charged as immovables, and even with these properties the charge is uncommon.
Laws permitting the use of residential houses as collateral have little practical
effect because the state owns most housing and rents to individuals. Industrial
and other commercial buildings are usually designed for special purposes and
also have little transferable value. The situation with respect to houses is,
however, slowly changing. Recent reforms to government housing regulations
encourage Chinese citizens to purchase the state-owned houses they currently




The Chinese charge against movables is analogous to the common law chattel
mortgage: both the chattel mortgage and the charge against movables secure the
obligation with goods. The definition of the term "goods" in common law
jurisdictions 95 is similar to the definition of "movables" in Chinese law,9 6 and,
as with the chattel mortgage, the Chinese charger remains in possession of the
collateral. The Chinese charge against movables, however, possesses more
flexibility than the common law concept. For example, the charge against
movables, like the charge against immovables, allows the parties of the
transaction to decide whether or not title to the collateral will be transferred to the
chargee. If title does not transfer, the chargee receives an independent right in
rem against the collateral. This right is effective against any other party,
including the charger. Furthermore, the charge against movables differs signif-
icantly from the chattel mortgage of common law jurisdictions in its lack of a
registration requirement. To date, only the Shenzhen Regulations and Shanghai
Regulations for Foreign Exchange Loans require the registration of charges
against movables; however, these laws apply locally and only to specialized
transactions.97 While the charge against movables may offer extensive protection
to the chargee, the lack of a Chinese national registration scheme does not afford
subsequent chargees protection from fraudulent conveyances.
e. Conditional Sale
The Chinese purchase by installment payments (fengi fukuan) parallels the
common law conditional sale. Typically, the purchase by installment payments
93. A committee of the State Council issued a document in March 1988, encouraging urban
Chinese to buy state-owned residential houses. See Encourage the Citizens to Buy Old State-Owned
Houses, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), Mar. 11, 1988, at 1.
94. See, e.g., the People's Bank of Construction's Interim Measures on Savings and Loans for
Purchasing Residential Houses (on file with the authors).
95. See, e.g., UCC, supra note 26, § 9-105(l)(h) and ONT. PPSA, supra note 27, § 1(k).
96. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
97. The Shenzhen Regulations apply only to loans to foreign invested enterprises in the
Shenzhen SEZ; see supra note 16 and accompanying text. The Shanghai Foreign Exchange
Regulations apply only to foreign exchange loans in the Shanghai region; see supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
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allows buyers to obtain otherwise unaffordable capital or consumer goods by
postponing and dividing the payments. This practice most often occurs in
compensation trade arrangements whereby international firms import capital
equipment into China and sell it in exchange for installment payments of
low-cost goods produced with the equipment. 98
Purchases by installment payments currently are unregulated in China. Thus,
the specifics of this type of business transaction remain uncertain. Not yet de-
termined, for instance, is whether the buyer or the seller possesses title to the goods
until all of the payments on thefenqifukuan have been made. Apparently, either
party may hold title to the collateral, depending on their intentions. If title transfers
to the purchaser, the fenqi fukuan is merely a commercial credit transaction for
the promotion of sales rather than a true security device. If, however, the Chinese
purchase on installment payments retains title in the seller, then it is a true charge
against collateral and as such is open to the common criticism of most security
devices employed in China: the absence of a registration requirement. When title
remains with the seller and no registration requirement exists, fraud upon third
party creditors becomes highly possible since the purchaser of the goods by
installment payments may appear to hold full title to the goods.
f. Lease
The lease as a security device is relatively uncommon in China. China
International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) represents one of the
financial institutions to employ the lease as a form of secured transaction. CITIC
has experimented with lease-sales of industrial equipment since 1980. 99 In
practice, the lease-sale transpires through a contractual arrangement where the
"lessor" retains title to the equipment being leased and the "lessee" gives a
personal guarantee for the payment of the "rent"; after an agreed amount of rent
is paid, title transfers to the lessee. Since China has failed to enact legislation
regarding these equipment leases, the law does not distinguish from true leases.
For the time being, however, such a distinction would serve no purpose because
China has no general security registration requirement.
g. Floating Charge
The floating charge is the only security device found in common law
jurisdictions that has no counterpart in Chinese practice. 1°° Nevertheless, a
98. For a detailed description of compensation trade arrangements see Moser, Foreign Investment
in China: The Legal Framework, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 90, 94-95 (M, Moser ed. 1987).
99. See Liu Tieming, The New Stage of Leasing Transactions in the PRC, JINGJI CHANKAO
(ECONOMIC REFERENCE), Mar. 20, 1986, at 2.
100. The floating charge, an Anglo-Canadian concept, is often described as floating like a cloud
over a designated class or even the entirety of a debtor's assets without hindering the disposition or
acquisition of such assets within the ordinary course of the debtor's business until an event occurs that
causes the charge to fall and fix upon such assets then in place. Gov'ts Stock & Other Securities Inv.
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liberal interpretation of the broad provisions of article 89(2) of China's Civil Law
would appear to authorize the floating charge. Detailed regulation of this device
could be added to current legislation and bank provisions with little modification
of their existing structures.' 0 ' Provisions allowing for the floating charge would
be particularly appropriate in China. Chinese enterprises often lack sufficient
immovables to secure all of the investment funds they desire to borrow from the
banks. Therefore, they generally offer additional types of property as collateral,
the bulk of which is inventory and other revolving assets. Consequently, the
addition of the floating charge to Chinese practice would permit enterprises to
obtain loans secured with such property without having to renegotiate and
re-register the charge upon each disposition.
h. Consignment
Consignment, a popular business practice in North America, is uncommon in
China. 10 2 The Chinese Government allows commercial credit in only limited
circumstances. ' 0 3 Furthermore, even where allowed, China's lack of financing
resources rarely permits use of the commercial credit; sellers usually sell goods
for cash rather than for credit. The rarity of the consignment in China probably
explains why it has not been directly addressed by the various Chinese security
laws. As the economic reforms continue and Chinese business practice is further
commercialized, consignments likely will gain popularity with the Chinese
business community. In this case, the consignment will often be used as a
security device and should then be regulated as such.
3. Creation of a Security Interest
The Chinese concept concerning the creation of a security interest differs
substantially from that found in the UCC and the Canadian PPSAs. Fulfilling the
requirements of creation, or "attachment,"'0 4 of a security interest under the
Co. v. Manila Ry. Co., [1897] App. Cas. 81, 86 (H.L.). It is interesting to note that the general
floating charge is not allowed under the laws of the United States. When Ontario enacted its PPSA,
supra note 27, modelling it after article 9 of the United States UCC, supra note 26, the floating
charge was elaborately integrated into the structure copied from the U.S. Code.
101. CIVIL LAw, supra note 11, at 93. The rule found in much of the present regional legislation
mandating the charger to maintain the integrity of the collateral would require amendment or
reinterpretation. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
102. In general, it is only employed when a manufacturer is trying to promote the sale of a new
line of products, and even in these situations it is not common.
103. See the Decisions of the State Council on Strengthening the Administration of Financial
Affairs and Controlling the Issuance of Currency, promulgated Jan. 29, 1981, in COMPILATION OF
CURRENT LAWS OF THE PRC, 1949-1985 (FINANCE AND TRADE), supra note 3, at 314. Section 5 of these
Decisions states:
All credits should be exclusively conducted by banks. Without consent of banks and
the controlling administrative body, enterprises must not extend any credit to
purchasers.
104. Both the UCC, supra note 26, § 9-203, and the ONT. PPSA, supra note 27, § 12, use the
term "attachment" to denote the creation of a security interest against collateral.
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UCC and the Canadian PPSAs results in restrictions on the rights of the debtor
with respect to the secured party. The Chinese concept of creation of a security
interest differs from that seen in North America in both its treatment of the time
and the effect of creation.
Under the UCC and the Canadian PPSAs the time of attachment of a security
interest is governed by common law concepts of contract formation. Thus, the
time of creation corresponds to the time dictated by the agreement that creates the
interest, provided value has been given and the debtor has rights in the collateral.
These concepts are embodied within the provisions of the UCC and the PPSAs
themselves.' 0 5 In Chinese law, the time of creation is equally governed by
contract law. Unfortunately, however, there is a vital misconception in Chinese
contract law that causes problems for Chinese secured transaction law.
According to Chinese law, contractual rights and obligations arise upon
formation of the contract. This rule also applies to agreements that create a
security interest. Chinese contract law defines the time of formation of a contract
as the time when the parties reach agreement' 0 6 and, if certain administrative
procedures are required such as witnessing, notarization, ratification, or regis-
tration, then formation occurs upon completion of these procedures. ' 07 The first
requirement, agreement between the parties, is uncontroversial as well as
consistent with Western concepts of contract formation and the statutory
definition of the term "contract" in Chinese law. It is the second requirement,
fulfillment of statutory or regulatory requirements, that creates problems for
Chinese secured transaction law, namely, a misconception regarding the forma-
tion of contractual rights and obligations between parties by the Government.
Consider, for example, problems related to the registration requirement. Ideally,
the registration of a contract should effect the purpose of the registration: to make
the contract public and to subject it to any administrative requirements. The
registration itself does not create the rights and obligations under the contract;
instead, these are created by the parties at the time of agreement. The law may
certainly declare that without registration the rights and the obligations are
unenforceable, but the law should not declare that the rights and obligations
remain uncreated until registration. Otherwise, an illogical conclusion results:
the Government, and not the contracting parties, creates the contractual rights
and obligations for the contracting parties through completion of the registration
requirement. Such a result is absurd and contradicts other definitions of
"contract" under Chinese law. 108
105. See UCC, supra note 26, § 9-203; ON'r. PPSA, supra note 27, § 12.
106. See the Economic Contract Law, supra note 10, § 9.
107. See GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 42, at 215, and JIANG PING & ZHANG PEILING, supra note
53, at 125.
108. The Civil Law, supra note 11, art. 85, defines "contract" as an agreement whereby the
parties establish, change, or terminate their civil relationship.
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The misconception of contract formation in Chinese law is not an arbitrary
phenomenon, but rather stems from Communist ideological constraints. Until
recently, the strict principle of mandatory central planning remained largely
unquestioned in the People's Republic. Under this ideology, all important
economic activities were subject to government direction and surveillance; any
activity not authorized or ratified by the government was void. While China is
now making efforts to reduce the role of state planning and introduce free
enterprise into the economy, the ideology of state supervision still retains
substantial influence on Chinese thought and practice. Consequently, the implied
requirement of state participation in contract formation arises.
This mistaken concept of contract formation pervades the entire system of
economic law in China and has an especially profound effect on its secured
transaction law. Since no concept of "unenforceable" exists under Chinese
contract law, a contract is either valid or void; there is no intermediate ground.
Therefore, the draftsmen of the Chinese security laws had little choice but to
deem the time of formation of a security interest as the time when all legal
requirements, such as registration, are fulfilled. Since Chinese law cannot treat
a security interest as created but not perfected, as the UCC and the Canadian
PPSAs, perfection of a security interest in China occurs simultaneously with the
creation of an interest. Thus, at the time a security agreement binds the debtor
and the creditor it also binds all third party interests.
The Chinese treatment of creation causes two significant problems. First, the
absence of a separate stage of perfection may discourage implementation of
measures for the protection of third parties. This problem is further discussed in
the discussion of perfection.' 0 9 Second, the standards for the creation of a
security interest vary among Chinese security laws. Most laws do not require
registration; as long as the security agreement is signed and comes into force as
the parties intended, the security interest is created.11 But other laws, for
example, the Shenzhen Regulations and Shanghai Foreign Exchange Regula-
tions, do require registration. The security interest is not created until the
registration requirement is fulfilled. This uneven treatment causes unfairness to
creditors since creditors who must register may encounter delay in the creation
of their interest and thus may lose priority against other creditors."'
Another problem related to the creation of security interests should be noted.
Section 18 of the Shenzhen Regulations requires the debtor to obtain consent
from any prior chargees before creating subsequent charges against collateral.
This requirement is both redundant and potentially stifling. As we shall discuss,
Chinese security laws determine priority among security interests according to
109. See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Civil Law, supra note 11; Provisions on Loan Contracts, supra note 29; Shanghai
Renminbi Regulations, supra note 18.
111. See further discussion of priority rules, infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
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the order of creation. Therefore, giving prior chargees the right to deny
subsequent charges upon collateral provides no extra protection for their prior
interests. The consent requirement is in fact potentially harmful. If prior chargees
exercise their right to prevent subsequent charges, the chargor may have
difficulty in obtaining further credit and in making optimum use of his property.
The consent requirement of the Shenzhen Regulations has been adopted in no
other Chinese security law, and wisely so.1
1 2
4. Perfection
The concept of perfection, fundamental to the Canadian PPSAs and article 9
of the UCC, refers to the highest stage of a secured party's interest-the acqui-
sition by the secured party of statutory rights against third parties. This concept
is almost entirely absent from Chinese law. Most Chinese laws and regulations
neither require transfer of possession nor registration to perfect a secured creditor's
interest. '1 3 Furthermore, Chinese law does not recognize the protection of third
parties' interests, the foremost purpose and effect of the North American pos-
session and registration requirements.' 14 With a few minor exceptions,'' 5 inter-
ests in collateral are only a matter between the two contracting parties.
112. A provision effectively similar to § 18 of the Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 16, is found
in § 8 of the Interim Measures of the People's Bank of Construction on Security for Loan Contracts,
supra note 24. No other bank regulations impose a similar requirement.
113. Some Chinese laws do require that certain types of charged collateral be possessed by the
chargee. Section 21 of the Shanghai Renminbi Regulations, supra note 18, for example, requires that
possession of all securities be transferred to the creditor. Most bank regulations also require transfer
of possession when securities and other negotiable instruments are provided as collateral. See the
Interim Trial Provisions of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Shanghai Branch), supra
note 25, § 6; the Interim Measures of the People's Bank of Construction on Security for Loan
Contracts, supra note 24, § 10; the Trial Regulations of the Agricultural Bank of China on Secured
or Guaranteed Loan Contracts, supra note 22, § 5; the Trial Regulations of the Agricultural Bank of
China (Shanghai Branch) on Secured Loan Contracts, supra note 23, § 6. The Agricultural Bank
(Shanghai Branch) Regulations also require transfer of possession when precious properties such as
jewelry are provided as collateral. A few other laws require registration when some types of collateral
are charged. The Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 16, require that all security interests in movables
and rights be registered with the Shenzhen Administration of Industry and Commerce, and that
security interests in houses be registered with the Shenzhen Administration of Houses and Land. The
Shanghai Foreign Exchange Regulations, supra note 19, require that all security interests be
registered with the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Control, Shanghai Branch, with the
exception of security interests in land use rights which, in accordance with the Shanghai Regulations
on the Transfer of Land Use Rights for Value, must be registered with the Shanghai Municipal
Registrar. One set of regulations, the Shanghai Foreign Exchange Regulations, requires both transfer
of possession and registration when securities are used as collateral.
114. Chinese laws which require possession or registration in certain circumstances do so for
reasons other than third party protection. The transfer of possession requirements were enacted to
protect the contracting creditor from the risk of accepting certain highly liquid forms of property as
collateral without obtaining possession of these properties. The registration requirements are
confined largely to transactions involving secured foreign debt and were enacted to allow the
government to administer and control such debt.
115. The Shanghai Renminbi Regulations, supro note 18, do provide some protection to third
parties. Section 13 of these Regulations requires a charger creating subsequent charges against
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The present Chinese secured transactions laws are thus seriously flawed. They
ignore the need for making security interests public and fail to protect the
legitimate interests of third parties. Improvement upon Chinese security laws
would require changes to the legal status of collateral possession in addition to
the creation of a registration system for all secured transactions.
a. Possession
Current Chinese laws and regulations allow contracting parties to determine
possession. The laws make no distinction between the pledge and nonpossessory
security devices. Thus, possession under Chinese law seems to have little legal
consequence. This apparent insignificance of collateral possession may result in
misinformation to third parties. Assume, for example, that a debtor in China
pledges properties. Before transferring possession of the collateral to the
creditor, however, it obtains additional credit from a second creditor, secured by
the same collateral but without the possession requirement. With the debtor still
in possession of the collateral and with no registry that may be searched, the
second creditor possesses no method by which his claim of priority may be
authenticated. Thus, the second creditor may have mistakenly forwarded his loan
on the understanding that he would have first claim to the collateral in case of
default. Nevertheless, existing Chinese law subordinates the second creditor's
interest to that of the first upon default. This result arises because the first
creditor's interest became effective against third parties when it concluded the
security agreement with the debtor, not when possession was later transferred.
Improvements to the present Chinese laws would make transfer of collateral
possession a legally significant act that provides notice of and perfection of the
secured party's interest. It should be emphasized that, in the absence of
registration, possession is required to protect the secured party's interest. If a
creditor does not obtain possession of the collateral under the terms of the
security agreement or by legal regulation, it will not have a priority interest over
other competing interests.
b. Registration
China could further improve its laws by adopting a uniform mandatory
registration system that allows easy confirmation of any previous charges against
collateral by any concerned member of the public. Adoption of such a
registration system is vital to the success of the new credit financing system.
collateral to notify "all concerned chargees." This provision could be read as requiring the charger
to notify the potential subsequent chargee of any prior interests. Even so, the protection afforded to
third parties by this provision is limited to secured third parties. The provision does not require notice
to general creditors or to purchasers. Section 18 of the Shenzhen Regulations, supra note 16, also is
an exception to requiring notice of other interests in the collateral. Notice in this case, however, is
notice to prior chargees of subsequent charges. The requirement provides no protection to subsequent
chargees. Indeed, it provides no additional protection to prior chargees since their interests already
have priority.
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China already has a nationwide administration system. This system is set up
under the Administration for Industry and Commerce (Gongshang Xingzheng
Guangli Ju) and could be used to implement a unified registration system for
collateral. The Administration currently handles the registration requirements set
up under the Shenzhen Regulations' 16 and could easily and efficiently extend its
registration services nationwide.
5. Priority
The priority rules of secured transaction laws regulate competing interests in
the same collateral. In the UCC and the Canadian PPSAs, priority is determined
with the assistance of the "perfection" concept. Chinese law contains no such
concept and therefore relies on the creation of the security interest to determine
priority. As discussed, the use of creation rather than perfection as the criterion
for priority is the source of many problems in Chinese security law. 117 The origin
of these problems lies in the underlying Chinese concept of creation rather than
with the concept of priority. We, therefore, shall not repeat our analysis of these
shortcomings in our discussion of priority rules. The Chinese priority rules are,
nevertheless, the source of certain difficulties in and of themselves.
Various security laws set out the Chinese rules of priority. Section 89(2) of the
Civil Law outlines the basic rule: "If the obligor defaults, the obligee has the
right, in accordance with legal provisions, to dispose of the collateral after
appraisal of its value or otherwise to sell the collateral and to use the proceeds for
repayment of the debt in priority over other claimants.'' 11 8 This subsection
provides that a security interest generally has priority over an unsecured credit.
Furthermore, it states that priority rules, like other aspects of secured transac-
tions addressed in the Civil Law, are subject to subsequent "legal provisions."
Consequently, the Civil Law provides the legal framework and leaves the details
to be determined by later national and regional legislation. The 1986 Law of
Bankruptcy of the People's Republic of China (Trial Implementation)' 9 is one
such law providing further detail. Section 28 of this law states: "Property in
which a security interest has been created shall not be subject to bankruptcy
proceedings."120 This rule suggests that a security interest has priority over all
other interests arising out of the same collateral. Together, the Civil Law and the
Bankruptcy Law imply ascendancy of a security interest over all other interests.
The Civil Law and the Bankruptcy Law leave undetermined, however, the
priority among security interests. This priority is addressed only by regional and
116. Note, however, that security interests created in houses are registered separately with the
Shenzhen City Housing and Land Control Administration. See the Shenzhen Regulations, supra note
16, § 13.
117. See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 11.
119. This law was enacted by the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress of
the PRC on Dec. 2, 1986 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Lawi, CCH, supra note 10, 13-522.
120. Id.
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specialized regulations. Under these laws determination of priority corresponds
to the order of creation. In situations where registration is necessary for creation,
as with security interests created under the Shanghai Foreign Exchange Regula-
tions, priority is determined by the order of registration. Those laws that do not
require registration, such as section 29 of the Shanghai Renminbi Regulations,
determine priority directly by the order of creation; creation occurs when the
parties reach agreement on the security interest and, if required, when formalities
such as notarization are completed.
The first rule of priority, the absolute ascendancy of secured interests over all
other claims, causes an anomaly in Chinese law-it elevates the secured interest
above the tax claims of the state treasury. The inferior claim of the state treasury
results from section 28 of the Enterprises Bankruptcy Law. This provision is
confusing because it contradicts various regional security laws that provide the
state with a priority interest. 12 1 Since all the regional security regulations were
promulgated after the Bankruptcy Law, it seems possible that the anomaly is
merely an uncorrected mistake in the latter. Indeed, if not a mistake, the
provision of the Enterprises Bankruptcy Law that provides the treasury with a
subordinate position would be incompatible with Chinese ideology and the
general legal theory of state precedence. Therefore, it seems likely that the
Bankruptcy Law will be amended to bring it into line with subsequent legislation
and Chinese legal theory.
A further anomaly arises from provisions of the Bankruptcy Law-the wage
claims of the employees of debtor enterprises are given an inferior position to
secured interests.' 2 2 Once again, conflicts with other Chinese laws and with
established ideology make the Bankruptcy Law position of absolute priority with
regard to the secured interest difficult to maintain. China still officially embraces
the ideology of leadership of the working class; the philosophy is constitutionally
entrenched. 123 Any law that would put the interest of creditors above those of
workers clearly conflicts with this ideology. Furthermore, such a law may prove
to be a political liability. Since the establishment of the People's Republic,
Chinese workers have come to rely on security in their employment. Should
enterprise bankruptcy and denial of back wages become a common phenomenon,
121. See Shanghai Renminbi Regulations, supra note 18, § 26, and the Shenzhen Regulations,
supra note 16, § 26. Note that the various laws may be interpreted so as to avoid conflict-if the
debtor goes bankrupt, the Bankruptcy Law applies and the treasury's interest is subordinate; if the
debtor simply defaults but does not go bankrupt, regional regulations apply and the treasury's interest
has priority. This, however, is not a satisfactory explanation. It begs the questions of why the
treasury's interest ever should be subordinate and why bankruptcy proceeding should be a means by
which it is so made.
122. See Bankruptcy Law, supra note 119, § 28, with reference to § 34.
123. See the CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REP. OF CHINA (1982), CCH, supra note 10, 4-500, art. 1,
which proclaims, The People's Republic of China is a people's democratic dictatorial socialist
country under the leadership of the working class and on the basis of the alliance of workers and
peasants.
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unrest among workers may grow. Thus, it seems likely that the Bankruptcy Law
will be amended in order to prevent such problems.
6. Rights and Remedies upon Default
Similar to common law jurisdictions, Chinese secured transaction law specifies
the rights and remedies upon default. These rights and remedies must provide, of
course, for realization of the security interest by the creditor, with the power of
realization being the basis of the creditor's security. But the security laws should
also impose conditions upon this realization in order to protect debtors from
arbitrary or unscrupulous actions by creditors. Contemporary Chinese law
requires improvements on both counts: it lacks an important remedy for
creditors, that of true retention, while also failing completely to protect the
legitimate interests of debtors.
Section 89(2) of the Chinese Civil Law sets out the basic right of the creditor
upon default of the debtor: "If the obligor defaults, the obligee has the right, in
accordance with legal provisions, to dispose of the collateral after appraisal of its
value [zhe jia] or otherwise to sell the collateral and to use the proceeds for
repayment of the debt in priority over other claimants." 124 Regional regulations
generally have the same simple provision, but in some cases give further
detail. 125 The laws and regulations together offer two main remedies for
creditors-retention of collateral and disposition of the collateral by sale or other
means. While these two remedies correspond to the two main remedies offered
by the UCC and the Canadian PPSAs, the Chinese provisions have substantial
deficiencies.
As a primary remedy, Chinese law permits the secured party to retain the
collateral after default by the debtor. This remedy, known as zhe jia, allows the
creditor to gain title to the collateral. Zhe jia requires appraisal of the collateral's
value and return of any surplus value above the amount of the outstanding
obligation to the debtor. To some extent, zhe jia resembles the remedy of
retention of collateral provided under section 9-505(2) of the UCC. 126 Section
9-505(2) permits the secured party, after default, to retain the collateral in
satisfaction of the debtor's obligation. This method is perhaps the simplest and
best method of security realization because it avoids both the expense and delay
associated with the sale of the collateral as well as the sensitive and difficult
problem of fair valuation. These evasions exemplify the main differences
between the UCC remedy of retention and the Chinese zhejia. By requiring fair
valuation and payment of surplus, zhe jia is effectively the same as the other
main UCC default remedy, disposition by sale or other means. Chinese law does
not provide for a distinct remedy of retention as found in the UCC.
124. See supra note 11.
125. See, e.g., Fuzhou Pawnbrokers Regulations, supra note 17, § 15.
126. ONT. PPSA, supra note 27, § 6(2), also provides such a remedy.
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Disposition, the second remedy under Chinese law, permits a creditor to sell
or otherwise obtain value for the collateral and then retain the proceeds in order
to pay off the outstanding obligation; any revenue in excess of the outstanding
obligation must be returned to the debtor. The Civil Law contains no detailed
provision regulating the form of sale; it merely requires that the sale be held "in
accordance with legal provisions."'1 27 Most of the regional laws dictate that all
sales of collateral be held at auction institutions designated by local
governments. 
128
The lack of a distinct remedy of retention, in addition to the existing remedy
of disposition, is a serious deficiency in the Chinese laws. The simplicity of the
retention remedy would be especially advantageous in contemporary China. The
requirement of valuation of collateral that exists under each of the current
Chinese remedies may cause unwelcome administrative headaches for China's
developing legal system.
The adoption of the retention remedy would necessitate the addition of certain
legal safeguards to protect the legitimate interests of debtors and concerned third
parties since the current Chinese laws are entirely insufficient in this respect.
None of the Chinese laws presently require that the creditor give notice to the
debtor or to the concerned third parties before it disposes of the collateral.
Furthermore, no Chinese law explicitly provides for the redemption of collateral
by a debtor, after default, through fulfillment of all outstanding obligations. The
Shanghai Renminbi Regulations are alone in implying a right of redemption by
providing for a grace period before the debtor can dispose of the collateral. 
129
The absence from Chinese law of the notice requirement, the explicit right of
redemption, and, with the one exception, a grace period seems to give the
creditor unrestrained power to deal with the collateral after default by the debtor.
The requirement in the Civil Law that all dispositions be "in accordance with
legal provisions" is little protection for debtors because no comprehensive
protective legal provisions exist. Considerable unfairness to debtors could result
unless the laws are amended in this regard.
The notice requirement, the right of redemption and the grace period are all
standard in North American law. With some modification, part 5 of the UCC,
which provides these rights to debtors, could be incorporated into Chinese law.
The right of redemption and grace period requirements could be adopted
immediately. The notice requirement, however, must await other changes in
Chinese law. The lack of a registration system would make it difficult for a
creditor to give notice to all persons with an interest in the collateral. Therefore,
until China adopts a unified registration system, the most that can be done with
127. See Civil Law, supra note 11, § 89(2).
128. See, e.g., the Shanghai Renminbi Regulations, supra note 18, § 27; Shenzhen Regulations,
supra note 16, § 24.
129. See the Shanghai Renminbi Regulations, supra note 18, § 25(5).
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regard to individual notice is to require notice to the debtor. Notice to other
persons with an interest in the collateral could be achieved by some form of
public notice. This public notice requirement should be formalized so that it
becomes the responsibility of the creditor and applies to all dispositions of the
collateral, including retention by the creditor.
III. Conclusion
In less than a decade, China has made considerable progress in drafting
modem laws of secured transactions. The Chinese Civil Law has established a
broad concept of secured financing that provides for almost all security
devices allowed by the contemporary laws of the United States and Canada,
while also responding to China's particular needs. Introduction of the broad
concept of charge (di ya) to Chinese law parallels the achievements of the U.S.
UCC and Canadian PPSAs in unifying different concepts of collateral-secured
credit.
Nevertheless, the present Chinese laws have serious flaws. Although the
Chinese law has progressed quickly, large gaps remain in its regulation of
secured transactions. The Civil Law provides a broad conceptual base for the
various types of secured transactions, but adds little detailed regulation. Only
the Shenzhen SEZ and the Municipality of Shanghai have comprehensive
provisions on secured transactions similar to the U.S. UCC and the Canadian
PPSAs. Even these, however, are relatively vague and incomplete. The
regulations on sureties, for instance, fail to address the important question of
the eligibility of government departments as guarantors of loans. Laws
governing charges against collateral fail to provide a general registration
system for collateral and fail to protect the legitimate interests of debtors and
third parties.
For many types of secured transactions parties to a loan contract must rely
upon their own contractual provisions because no detailed security law
applies. 130 Indeed, as even the detailed Chinese laws are vague and incomplete,
parties contracting under such laws have considerable freedom to vary the terms
of their agreement according to their needs. 131 Thus, foreign lenders or
borrowers need not be excessively wary of the confusing array of national and
regional laws and bank regulations; the terms of the contract between the
borrower and the lender most often will provide the terms governing the detailed
aspects of their secured transaction. For secured transactions where national or
regional legislation would have precedence, foreign investors of course would be
130. For example, the secured loan regulations issued by various Chinese commercial banks
function essentially as model or standard form contracts for loans from these institutions.
131. Of course, where the provisions of one of the detailed laws specifically applies, it would have
precedence over any contradictory contractual stipulation.
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well advised to ascertain the applicable law and so stipulate it as part of their
contract. 132
While contractual stipulation may overcome many of the problems with
Chinese secured transactions law, continued reliance on the contract may not be
a wise long-term policy for China. Under a system where legal safeguards are
lacking, debtors and innocent third parties may become victims of the private
law-making process. Unless China's security laws are fair to debtors and third
parties as well as to creditors, they will not be workable or politically viable. It
is vital, therefore, that the present security laws be expanded and refined.
Chinese lawmakers may find article 9 of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code to
be a useful reference for these changes, but must ensure that China's laws on
secured financing conform to its particular credit needs and to its level of legal
development.
132. See Horsley, Commercial Lending in China, THE CHINA Bus. REV. 40 (Jan.-Feb. 1988), for
a review of practical guidelines for foreign lenders in China. Ms. Horsley notes that most foreign
lenders have stipulated that their charges against collateral be governed by foreign law, though the
enforceability of such a provision under Chinese law is doubtful.
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